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CHAPTER I. BUSINESS RISK IN AGRICULTURE 
Farming is s usceptible to various kinds of risk. Within 
this risky environmen t, each farmer possesses a set of risk 
management options and tools that may be used to alter o r 
transfer risks. The goal of t his study is to determine if 
there are significant relationships among the use of such 
business risk transfer tools and farm c haracteristics , such as 
age of the operator, farm size, financial r isk and performance, 
and farm policy preferences . 
Risk Factors in the Farm Environment 
Risk is usually defined as the variability of income or 
the probability that an event would have an adverse effect on 
income. Weather and the environment represent a set of risks 
that are beyond the control of farmer s. These risk factors 
integrate with the unique production resour ces and practices of 
eac h farmer to generate a perceived set of business production 
risks. 
Commodity supply and demand conditions, market 
institutions, and farm prog rams represe n t another set of risk 
factors beyond the control of individual farmers. These 
factors combine and integrate with the unique marketing 
resources and practices of each farmer to generate a perceived 
set of business market ing risks. 
Interest rates, inflation, and changes in asset values are 
another set of factors that are generally beyond the control of 
2 
individual farmers. These factors combine with the unique 
financial resources and debt practices of each farmer to 
generate a set of financial risks. 
Business and financial risks interact in such a way to 
generate a unique set of total risks faced by each firm. 
Risk Transfer Tools and Strategies 
For each kind of risk, there is a set of risk management 
alternatives. Such alternatives include traditional risk 
management strategies, for example, trade-offs between 
diversification and specialization, livestock breeding and 
feeding practices, excess machinery capacity, timeliness in 
planting and harvesting, and participation in government farm 
programs. A number of other risk transfer tools are now 
available, including a variety of forward contracting 
arrangements and commodity options in addition to hedging on 
the futures market. Farmer use of these marketing risk 
transfer tools has increased as farm prices have become more 
variable since the 1960s. 
In addition, the federal government has attempted in 
recent years to shif t away from providing emergency disaster 
relief for drought affected farmers by providing subsidized 
multiple peril crop insurance for farmers. While many private 
insurers have historically written hail and fire crop 
insurance, multiple peril crop insurance offers much broader 
coverage of production risks. 
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Other policies and studies have acknowledged the 
interrelationships of the various risks and risk management 
tools available. For example, producers who borrow from the 
Farmers Home Administ ration (FmHA) are required to purchase 
crop insurance. FmHA is the lender of last resort . This 
policy expresses an apparent social value in which s ociety 
believes that producers with large financial risks ought to 
reduce business risks by purchasing crop insurance. Schmiesing 
(1989) argues that combining crop insurance with forward 
con tracting or options reduces the risk of incurring large 
penalties on the marketing tools in the event of a short crop. 
Problem Statemen t 
Various studies use linear programming, quadratic 
programming, or simulat ion to analyze the optimal risk 
management options for producers. This study a ttempts to 
analyze who uses these tools and if there are any statistically 
significant relationships among various risk management tools 
and farm characteristics. This information may provide 
important implications to policy makers, agribusinesses, and 
producers. 
As government moves toward market-oriented policy, 
commodity price risks may likely increase for producers. 
Producers would be forced to adopt risk transfer strategies or 
bear the increases in risk on their own. Government officials 
may want to know who would most likely use the private risk 
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transfer tools, if we continue to move to market oriented 
policy. Government officials are also concerned about who uses 
crop insurance given the ever present possibility of drought 
and dry conditions prevalent throughout much of the United 
States during 1988 and 1989. 
Agribusinesses are interested in designing products that 
farmers want. Therefore, agribusinesses are likely to be 
interested in knowing which risk transfer products are used by 
farmers and which farmers are most likely interested in 
utilizing and purchasing the various risk management tools. 
Farmers are interested in what other farmers are doing for 
competitive purposes. Since many of the risk transfer tools 
- . have only been available for a few years, many farmers are 
interested in how the tools are being used and who is using 
such tools. 
Thesis Objectives 
The following three objectives are the guides used for 
conducting this research effort. The thesis objectives are: 
1. To collect primary data and develop a descriptive 
analysis of the use of selected risk management tools by Iowa 
farmers. 
2. Test ~or significant relationships between the use of 
marketing risk transfer tools and farm characteristics. 
3. Test for significant relationships between the use of 
crop insurance and farm characteristics. 
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Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter II provides a review of literature and develops 
the conceptual framework from which hypothesized relationships 
are developed. Chapter III reviews the data collection 
procedu res and methodology used , and presents the hypothesized 
relationships. Chapter IV provides an analysis of results. 
Chapter V draws the thesis conclusions, implications, and 
suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Decision Making Under Uncertainty 
Theory 
Empirical specification of economic theory often assumes 
perfect knowledge of input/ output relationships and future 
events. Rarely, however, does a farm manager know with 
certainty the final outcome of a decision at the time of the 
decision. Although farm managers face a less than certain 
environment, they can form expectations about possible 
outcomes. A classic economic assumption is that farmers 
attempt to maximize the present value of the expected profits 
from their operations. 
Various attempts have been made to incorporate measures of 
risk and risk preference concepts into the classical model of 
the firm. In the early 1700s, Bernoulli was one of the first 
to theorize that individuals do not always allocate resources 
on the basis of maximized expected gain. He proposed an 
alternative expected utility hypotheses that included expected 
value and risk preferences (Bussey, 1978). 
In accordance with this concept, decision-makers attach 
preferences to the potential occurrence of future events. 
These preferences and probabilities are unique to each farmer. 
Each farmer has different experiences and analytical ability to 
perceive disequilibrium, trends, and chance events and to 
diagnose corrective action. Risk preferences represent farmer 
attitudes toward diverting potential income to reduce the 
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variation in income o r probability of a large negative income 
deviation expected by the firm. Therefore, the addition of 
risk preferences to the firm's objective function creates a 
problem of weighting multiple objectives to reflect the 
trade-offs between expected i ncome and income variation or 
negative deviation. 
Knight (1921} di v ided decision making into two situations 
in a world with less than perfect knowledge, risk and 
uncertainty. He used the term "risk" to refer to situations 
where the decision-maker knows all a l ternative outcomes and the 
objective probabilities associated with each outcome. 
"Uncertainty" referred to situations where the decision-maker 
does not know either all alternative outcomes or the objective 
probabilities associa t ed with each. 
Heady (1952} distinguished between decisions involving 
risk and those involving uncertainty, based on knowledge of the 
uncertain event's underlying probabili t y distribution. He used 
the term ''risk" to refer to the variability of outcomes which 
could be measured objectively based on either (l} a priori 
knowledge of the underlying probability distribution or (2} a 
sample of sufficient size to establish the statistical 
probability of the uncertain event. "Uncertainty" referred to 
outcomes with ~robability distributions that cannot be measured 
empirically, so that any estimate of probability would be 
entirely subjective. 
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Modern decision theory is based on the subjective 
probability formulated by the decision maker. The term 
"subjective" refers to probability measures elicited from the 
decision maker, while the term "objective'' refers to 
probability measures computed from historical observations 
(Sonka and Patrick, 1984). Since even objective probabilities 
involve the subjective use by the decision-maker, the 
distinction between "risk" and "uncertainty" is unimportant, an 
the terms are often used interchangeably. 
Portfolio theory can help explain how farm managers make 
decisions involving risk. It is often assumed that investors 
make decisions based solely on the expected return of a 
portfolio of securities, and on the risk, or variability 
associated with that portfolio (Franks, Broyles, and Carleton, 
1985). Likewise, it is often assumed that farmers decide what 
bundle of commodities to produce based on the expected return 
of the commodities produced and on the variability of that 
return. Given equal expected returns for alternative 
production possibilities, risk averse managers are assumed to 
prefer the alternative with less variability. Alternatively, 
farm managers who are risk neutral are presumed to maximize the 
present value of expected profit regardless of risk. 
Empirical studies 
Empirical assumptions of risk preferences are incorporated 
into economic models using a variety of approaches. Some 
analysts use the subjective probability hypothesis by 
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suggesting that farmers base production and investment 
decis i~ns upon how the risk environment influences personal or 
farm goals (Young, 1979). 
Patrick uses this approach. He asked farmers to select a 
set of farm firm goal assumptions, with risk preferences 
implicitly included in the goals, to simulate the impacts of 
firm goals on capital structure and farm growth. An iterative 
budgeting model with stochastic yields and prices is used to 
simulate outcomes over a period of years (Patrick, 1979). This 
approach relies primarily upon indirect elicitation of risk 
preferences by analyzing farm goals as articulated by a sample 
of individual farm decision-makers (Patrick, Whittaker, and 
Blake, ~980; Dillion and Scandizzo, 1978). 
The objective probability hypothesis is used by others by 
analyzing the observed behavior of farm firm decisions 
regarding the use of risk management strategies. For example, 
one study found that approximately two-thirds of a sample of 
Indiana farm operators exhibited a risk neutral attitude when 
developing annual crop mix plans (Brink and Mccarl, 1978). The 
remaining individuals exhibited a risk avoidance behavior. 
Such empirical estimates of observed risk preferences in crop 
mix decisions have been incorporated into a stochastic linear 
programming models with a risk adjusted expected return 
objective function (Edelman, 1981). 
A number of studies have used portfolio theory and 
quadratic programming to analyze risk behavior in the context 
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of farm planning and farm financial management (Collins and 
Barry, 1986; Sanint and Barry, 1983; Barry, Baker, and Sanint, 
1981 ; Robinson and Brake, 1979) . 
Another approach is to incorporate a disaster definition 
of risk preferences that would involve subject ive and objective 
probability criteria. Moscardi employs a safety first rule for 
defining disaster survival with a subsistence level of risk 
free income (Moscardi and de Janvry, 1977). 
Richardson and Nixon (1986) use a variation of this 
approach to develop a model containing a set of criteria 
regarding firm level effects of various policy alternatives, 
the "Firm Level Income Tax and Farm Policy Simulator . " A final 
approach to incorporating risk preferences is to use Monte 
Carlo simulations (Leatham, Mccarl, and Richardson, 1987; 
Falatoonzadeh, Conner, and Pope, 1985) to develop probability 
distributions of outcomes. 
In review of the risk behavior literature as applied to 
agriculture, much of it does not capture the interrelationships 
among the factors cons idered by farme rs in making risk 
management decisions. The the focus of this thesis is on who 
actually uses the various business risk management tools and 
what factors influence these risk management decisions. 
Measurement and Definition of Farm Risks 
Relationship between business and financial risk 
Business and financial risks are two types of risk faced 
by the farm firm. Business risk is the risk inherent with a 
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particular farm firm independent of how it is financed (Gabriel 
and Baker, 1980). By definition, business risk is the risk 
associated with a farm firm that is 100 percent equity 
financed. Business risk is generally reflected in the 
variability of net income or net cash flows (Gabriel and Baker, 
1980). A high (low) coefficient of variation would indicate 
high (low) risk. The many sources of business risk in 
agriculture may be commonly classified as: 
1. Production or technical risk: Risk due to the random 
variability inherent with the production process, including 
yield variability. 
2. Marketing or price risk: Risk due to variation in 
prices of either farm output or production inputs. 
3. Technological risk: Risk that current decisions may be 
offset by future improvements in technology. 
4. Legal and social risk: Risk due to changes in the 
legal and social setting the firm operates in. 
5. Human sources of risk: Risk due to the human factors 
of production, labor and management. 
Financial risk, on the other hand, is associated with debt 
service requirements of the firm and is reflected in the added 
variability of net income due to the use of debt and interest 
rate variability. Financial risk includes both solvency and 
liquidity risk. Solvency risk refers to the probability that 
assets will pay all debt obligations if the farm were to be 
sold. It measures the risk of business failure due to the use 
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of debt financing. 
Liquidity risk refers to the probability that assets will 
generate e nough cash to pay current obligations. It measu res 
the risk of failure to make a c co un ts payable, principal and/o r 
interest payments on time . 
The principle of increasing r isk describes the i n t eraction 
be t ween business and financial r isk (Lee, Boehlje, Nelson, and 
Murray , 1980). More risk, or va r iability, is associated with 
increased use of leverage or debt capital, due to the need to 
make fixed interest payments. As the amount of debt used 
relative to equity increases , total risk becomes greater at an 
i ncreasing rate. Increased leverage will increase income as 
long as the marginal rate of retu rn of capital exceeds the the 
margina l cost of debt capital. However , the variability o f 
that i ncome stream will increase, as well, as leverage 
increases. 
Gabrie l and Baker (1980) researched the relationship 
between business and financial risk. They studied the level of 
financial risk accepted , given the level of inherent business 
r isk. They hypothesized that a decl i ne in business risk would 
lead to the acceptance of greater financial risk. This would 
reduce the effects of business risk on total risk. They found 
this to be true in aggregate. Howeve r, they found that 
different categories of farms might have different responses, 
depending on the par ticular risk preferences of the fa rm 
manager a nd other characteristics such as farm size or type. 
13 
Different business risk strategies may be adopted by 
farmers depending on the level of financial risk experienced, 
as measured by solvency or liquidity ratios. One might expect 
that those farms with greater solvency risk might be more 
likely to use tools to minimize the risk of price or i ncome 
decreases in order to satisfy creditors. Alternatively , 
farmers with adequate liquidity ratios might be willing to 
accept greater business risks with the hope of potentially 
higher returns. 
Measurement of financial performance 
Financial statements are commonly used to measure business 
and financial risks. Risk is reflected in the variability of 
net operating income or net cash flows relative to the 
resources available . The balance sheet measures the assets, 
debts , and net worth of the farm operation at a point in time. 
The income statement measures net income over a period of time. 
Financial ratios formulated from the balance sheet and 
i ncome statement can be used to measure financial risk and 
performance . Early analyses of the 1980s farm debt situation 
were based on the farm debt-to-asset ratio (Jolly, 1984; 
Melichar, 1984). The debt-to-asset (DA} ratio has 
traditionally been used by farmers and lenders to measure 
solvency, or long-term borrowing capacity. The DA ratio is the 
ratio of total debts divided by total assets, multiplied by 
100 . It expresses in percentage terms the total amount of the 
farm operation financed by creditors. 
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A common standard is that farm operations with DA rat ios 
greater than 40 percen t are considered to be financ i all y 
stressed, or subject to difficulties in meeting the fixed 
financial obligations of principal and interest. However, some 
farmers experience fi nancial difficul ties with lower rat ios and 
some farm enterpri ses with superior management may neve r 
experience serious fi nancial stress with much higher ratios. 
Lines and Zulauf (1985) used logist ic regression to test 
for significant rela tionships between the DA ratio and selected 
socioeconomic characte r istics for a sample of Ohio f armer s . 
They found significan t positive relationships between DA ratio 
and o perator age and farm size, and a significant negative 
relationship between DA ratio and percent of land that was 
owned. 
Profitability is measured by the re turn on asse ts (ROA) 
and return on equity (ROE) ratios. The ROA is equal to net 
farm income plus interest expense all divided by the total 
asset value, multiplied by 100. This def ini tion is 
traditionally used by agricultural economists but differs from 
the business school definition , where return on investment is 
calculated using i ncome after interest expense. The ROA is ne t 
income (before interest payments) per dollar of assets, 
expressed as a percentage . The ROA represents the whole farm 
prof i t margin of a 100 percent equity f inanced firm and 
indicates farm management performance, given environmental 
factors, independent of the financing decision. A common 
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standard is that good and superior farm operations normally 
have an ROA of at least eight percent (Edelman and Olsen, 
1988}. 
The ROE is net farm income divided by the equity value, 
multiplied by 100. The ROE is net income per dollar of equity 
and represents the return to the equity investment, expressed 
as a percentage. The ROA will equal the ROE for firms that are 
100 percent equity financed. Increased use of debt capital 
will increase profitability if the ROE is greater than the 
interest rate on the borrowed funds. This measure is subject 
to variation in the interest rate expected on borrowed 
capital. A common ROE standard is that good and superior 
operations normally have an ROE of at least six percent 
(Edelman and Olsen, 1988}. 
Other financial ratio measures include: (l} debt to cash 
flow , which measures ability to service debt, (2} the current 
ratio, which measures liquidity or ability to meet current 
obligations and (3} the earned net worth ratio, which measures 
change in equity due to earnings. 
Barickman (1985) used a classification system to measure 
financial stress based on the ROA relative to the ROE. She 
used logistic regression techniques to test for significant 
relationships between the four classes and several farm 
operation characteristics. A stronger relationship was found 
between the financial performance classification and other 
financial variables than between financial performance 
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classification and demographic variables. 
Jolly et al. (19 85 ) u t ilized a return on equity ra tio 
based on cash flow rathe r than accrual income to mea s ure 
financial stress. Jolly's cash flow included the cash income 
from off-farm income and did not include cash flow from the 
sale of machinery o r real estate. Th i s cash flow represents 
cash available to replace machinery or equipment, purchase real 
estate, or pay income tax. 
Jolly and Olsen (1986) used a measure of financial stress 
based on a combination of liquid i ty and solvency measures. A 
classificat i on system was developed us i ng a cash flow to equity 
ratio, which is iden t icle to the liquidity measure used by 
Jolly et al. (1985) and the DA ratio, a measure of solvency. 
Based on this classif i cation system, farms were placed into one 
of four groups classified as financially strong, stable, 
restructurable, and s everely stressed. This same 
classification system was used in subsequent analyses on 
national farm financial data by Doye, Jolly, and Choat (1987) 
and on Iowa farm financial data by Edelman and Olsen (1987, 
1988). 
Melichar proposed a multivariate measure of financial 
stress based on the DA ratio, level of equity, the ROA, and ROE 
(cited in Lins et al. 1987). The ROA and ROE suggested by 
Melichar were based on cash flow rathe r than accrual income. 
This tends to support the approach used by Jolly and Olsen 
(1986) on Iowa farm financial data. 
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Lins et al. (1987) summarized several of the measures used 
to measure financial stress and their strengths and 
weaknesses. Lins pointed out that the DA ratio reveals little 
about income generating potential. He noted that a high DA 
ratio may signal poor income in some cases but the profitable 
use of leverage in other cases. He also noted that most of the 
income measures of financial stress were based on cash flow 
rather than accrual income . Cash flow may not accurately 
reveal whether the farm is experiencing financial stress since 
some farmers may have high cash flow return ratios only due to 
forced liquidations of crop and livestock inventories. Also, 
some operations may not have high cash return ratios as income 
. may be delayed until the next accounting period. He does 
acknowledge, however, that many studies are limited to using 
cash return ratios since the data needed to figure accrual 
income is not easily obtained. 
Penson (1987) emphasized the need to use several financial 
indicators to monitor farm financial trends. In addition to 
the DA , ROA, and ROE ratios, he suggests using a times interest 
earned ratio, a financial leverage index, and a debt burden 
ratio. The times interest earned ratio is calculated as the 
earnings before interest and taxes divided by the total 
interest payments, and measures the farm's ability to pay 
interest out of operating profit. 
The financial leverage index is the firm's ROE divided by 
its ROA. It is similar to the measure used by Barickman (1985) 
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to measure financial stress. This ratio indicates whether the 
farm operation would benefit from increased or decreased 
leverage. 
Finally, the debt burden ratio was calculated as the net 
cash farm income divided by total farm debt outstanding. It 
indicates the ability to retire debt obligations from income. 
Penson concluded that the three additional ratios outlined 
(times interest earned, financial leverage index, and debt 
burden) signaled the buildup of farm financial stress 
experienced in the 1980s long before the more commonly used DA, 
ROA, and ROE ratios. 
The literature suggests a variety of approaches for 
measuring financial performance and risk. While financial risk 
is commonly measured by the variability of income over time, 
several financial ratios can measure the financial health of a 
particular industry or firm at a point in time and help predict 
future trends in financial performance. Tracking several 
measures of profitability, solvency, and liquidity can be more 
insightful than the use of any one measure alone. However, 
much of the literature appears to be based on conventional 
wisdom and professional experience rather than on empirical 
tests of significance. Exceptions include the studies by Lines 
and Zulauf (1985) and Barickman (1985). 
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Tools for Transferring Farm Business Risk 
There are severa l tools and strategies for transferring 
the various types of business risk. For example, in production 
risk, risk management strategies include enterprise 
diversification, the selection of stable enterprises, and the 
use of crop insurance. Methods to reduce marketing risk 
include the spreading of sales throughout the year, hedging on 
the futures market, forward contracting for inputs or outputs, 
and using agricultural commodity options. In addition, many 
producers join farm organizations and commodity groups as a 
means of influencing farm programs to moderate business risks. 
For this analysis, selected risk management tools for reducing 
marketing and production risk are examined. The selected tools 
include forward contracting , commodity futures hedging, 
agricultural commodity options, and crop insurance. 
Uses of forward pr icing tools 
Forward contracts, futures hedges, and agricultural 
commodity options are three tools that allow the farm manager 
to establish a price or price floor for a particular commodity 
before that commodity is actually sold or purchased. 
Forward contracts are contracts between a particular 
seller and a particular buyer for a specified amount, to be 
delivered by a specified time, for a price specified in the 
contract. Three different types of forward contracts are 
normally available to Iowa producers. The most common type 
used is the forward cash contract which specifies a fixed price 
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and quantity, subject to discounts for moisture and quality 
factors (Futrell, 1987). 
Another type of forward contract is a minimum price 
contract. This contract specifies an amount to be sold at a 
future date at a price level that cannot be below some 
specified amount. A third type of forward contract is a price 
later contract. This contract specifies an amount to be sold 
at a later date but allows the farmer to specify the price at a 
later date. 
Forward contracts are arrangements typically made between 
farmers and their local elevators or farmers and their 
livestock packers. In most cases, the elevator or packer will 
in turn take an offsetting position in the futures market or 
forward contract itself in order to lock in a margin. While 
forward contracts are useful in establishing a price for farm 
produce, not all risk is eliminated. If a greater amount is 
forward contracted than is actually produced due to a short 
crop, the farmer must then purchase the commodity at the 
prevailing prices and possibly pay a significant penalty in 
order to meet the contract terms. The amount of this loss will 
depend on how short the crop is of meeting the terms and what 
the price of the commodity is at the time of execution of the 
contract. 
In contrast to forward contracts, futures contracts and 
agricultural commodity option contracts are traded among many 
buyers and sellers on commodity exchanges. Commodity exchanges 
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are highly regulated and operate within specific rules of 
trade. 
Commodity futures contracts are contracts to deliver a 
specified amount of a given commodity at a future time and to a 
specific place. By using the futures markets, it is possible 
to price a commodity as much as a year in advance. By selling 
a contract in the futures market equal to what will be sold at 
that future date, it is possible to "hedge'' or lock in a 
minimum selling price for the commodity, assuming no change in 
local basis. Basis is the difference between the local cash 
price and the futures price. Since cash and futures prices 
tend to move in the same direction, losses in futures hedging 
tend to be offset by the increasing value of the actual 
product. Likewise, any loss in the cash value of the commodity 
tends to be offset by a gain in the futures hedge. In contrast 
to forward cash contracts , however, not all price risk is 
eliminated through the use of futures contracts because of 
basis risk, or possible adverse changes in the basis. 
A distinction is drawn between two groups of traders--the 
speculators and the hedgers. Speculators try to anticipate 
price movements and buy or sell commodities in an attempt to 
earn the highest return. Hedgers have a different purpose for 
buying and selling futures contracts. Hedgers are involved in 
owning or producing the commodity that they trade on the 
futures market. Hedgers use futures markets to avoid risks of 
unfavorable price changes on the cash market (Futrell, 1987). 
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Agricultural commodity options are contracts that allow 
one to buy or sell a futures contract at a certain price, 
called the strike price, until a specific expiration date. 
Options are useful to minimize two risks that keeps many 
farmers from forward pricing (1) production risk, or the risk 
of forward contracting more than is produced and (2) the risk 
that prices will rise after selling the crop (Futrell, 1987). 
Any loss associated with purchasing commodity options is 
limited to the amoun t paid for the option, called the premium. 
Because of this feature, an advantage of options over futures 
contracts is that margin calls are not required. In addition, 
an advantage of options over forward contracting is that 
significant penalties from the use of forward contracts due to 
drought or other natural disasters are avoided. 
A few applied studies have examined the actual use of 
forward contracting, futures hedges and options. Schmiesing et 
al. (1986) examined lende r attitudes and practices toward 
various marketing alternatives in South Dakota. Surveys were 
sent to agricultural loan officers at all the commercial banks, 
Farm Credit System offices, and Farmers Home Administration 
county off ices in the state. Survey results indicated that a 
significant proportion of lenders were not providing credit for 
margin accounts to allow producers to hedge, and about half 
sometimes placed limitations on the amount of credit provided 
after a hedged position was established. The research 
indicated that attention must be directed towards increasing 
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the knowledge of marketing alternatives by lenders to help 
reduce unnecessary lender restrictions on producer marketing 
strategies. 
Use of crop insurance 
Crop insurance is available in two forms, multiple peril 
and limited peril, including hail / fire insurance. Hail / fire 
insurance is available under two types of plans, spot and area 
(Edwards and Vogt, 1988). Spot coverage pays for losses based 
on the percentage loss on the damaged acres only--normal yields 
on non-damaged fields do not reduce payments. Area plans pay 
based on the percentage yield loss averaged across the entire 
insured unit. Hail / fire insurance is offered by private 
insurers, and may be purchased on only part of the farm and up 
to only a few weeks before harvest (Calkins and DiPietre, 
1983). 
Multiple peril crop insurance is subsidized by the federal 
government and covers a much broader range of production 
risks. Multiple peril insurance guarantees a minimum average 
yield per acre for the insured crop with the minimum determined 
by the level of coverage chosen--50 percent, 65 percent, or 75 
percent of the long term average yield (Edwards and Vogt, 
1988). Multiple peril crop insurance on most crops covers 
losses due to drought, excessive moisture, hail, wind and 
frost / freeze. The farmer has the option to purchase multiple 
peril crop insurance without hail / fire coverage, but must then 
purchase an equivalent dollar amount of hail/f ire coverage 
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through other sources. Multiple peril crop insurance must be 
purchased by the date specified as the end of the sales 
period,which is September 30 for winter crops and March 30 for 
summer crops in Iowa (Edwards and Vogt, 1988). 
Lee and Djogo ( 1984 ) evaluated the effects on income 
variability of the use o f multiple peril crop insurance. They 
used linear programming to develop risk-return trade-off 
frontiers for a 600-acre eastern cornbelt grain farm. They 
found that the use of multiple peril crop insurance could be 
increased if higher coverage levels were offered in low risk 
areas. They also found that the use of multiple peril crop 
insurance was effective in reducing loan losses for lenders. 
Leatham, Mccarl, and Richardson (1987) using Monte Carlo 
simulation for Texas wheat / sorghum operations, found that 
moderately risk-averse farmers would prefer to purchase crop 
insurance when firm failure became an issue or if yields were 
extremely variable. They also found t hat lenders always 
preferred the use of crop insurance, especially when firm 
failure was an issue. 
Pflueger and Schmiesing (1987) investigated lenders 
attitudes toward financing the premiums for federal multiple 
peril and hail/fire crop insurance. The study was based on a 
survey mailed to agricultura l lending officers in South 
Dakota. They found that (1) lenders believe borrowers are more 
apt to purchase hail / fire insurance rather than multiple peril 
insurance ( 2) borrowers are sensitive to the cost of multiple 
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peril crop insurance, and (3} that lenders seem to feel that 
crop insurance is not a viable alternative for producers who 
are in a strong financial position. The research suggests that 
lenders' willingness to finance crop insurance premiums is 
directed toward those farm operations "who can not afford" to 
self insure against crop loss. It also suggests that lenders 
attitudes toward financing crop insurance is affected by the 
borrower's financial risk class. 
Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model developed for this thesis shows 
possible relationships among environmental factors associated 
with a particular farm, farm c.haracter istics, and the farm 
manager's risk management decisions. It is hypothesized that a 
farm manager will choose to use or not to use various risk 
management tools depending upon environmental factors, farm 
factors, financial factors, and other risk management 
decisions. The conceptual model is outlined in Figure 2.1. The 
conceptual model leads to the development of hypothesized 
relationships regarding the use of the selected risk management 
tools, which are outlined in Chapter III. 
Environmental factors are presumed to affect the use of 
risk management tools in a uniform fashion across the area of 
the study. This assumption is required, in part, due to a lack 
of site specific environmental data. Therefore, this thesis 
focuses on farm resource factors, farm policy preferences, 
26 
financial status , and use of other risk management tools to 
explain the use of risk transfer tools. Farm policy preferences 
are explored more ful l y in studies by Edelman and Lasley (1988) 
and by Orazem, Otto, and Edelman (1988). 
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Environmental Risk Factors 
Weather 
Markets 
Technology 
Legal 
Policy 
Social 
'f 
Resource Risk Factors 
Business Risk Variables 
Farm Goals 
Operator Characteristics 
Farm Size 
Enterprise Mix 
Farm Policy Preferences 
'f 
Financial Variables 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
Return on Assets 
Financial Stress Class 
y 
Risk Manaqement Decisions 
Use of Forward Pricing 
Use of Crop Insurance 
Figure 2.1. Conceptual Model Used in Developing Hypotheses 
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CHAPTER III. EMPIRICAL METHODS 
The Data 
The empirical analysis in this thesis i s based on data 
obta i ned from a survey of Iowa farmers and their financial 
status. The survey was conducted in April 1988, by Iowa State 
University in coope ration with the Iowa Office of Agricultural 
Statistics. The survey was mailed to 5,000 Iowa farm 
operators. About 1,000 surveys were returned, and 551 surveys 
had complete balance sheet and income data for the financial 
analysis. Compared to the Census of Agriculture, the sample 
under-represents farm operations under 50 acres and farm 
operators under 35 years old, so it is more representative of 
established commercial farms. The distribution of farm 
operations by age and acre categories for the sample is 
compared to the 1982 Census in Table 3.1. The distributions 
for the 1987, 1986, and 1985 finance surveys are also included 
They show a fairly consistent sample from year to year. 
Possible structural changes due to the farm finance crisis make 
comparisons with the 1982 census somewhat dubious. 
The completed surveys provided farm income statement and 
beginning and ending balance sheet data. The 1988 survey also 
asked questions concerning the use of marketing strategies, 
crop insurance, att itudes toward marketing institutions, and 
farm policy preferences. The survey instrument is shown in the 
Appendix. 
29 
Table 3.1. Selected Comparisons Between the 1982 Census and 
the 1985-1988 Iowa Farm Finance Survey Responses 
(Edelman and Olsen, 1988) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1982 
Survey Survey Survey Survey Census 
Farm Size 
(acres OEerated} Distribution ( % ) 
Under 50 1.1 1. 7 1. 7 3.1 17 .6 
50-179 15.2 16 . 5 15 . 8 13.2 26.8 
180-499 54.0 51. 9 49 .9 48.5 40.1 
500-999 25.0 24.4 27 . 1 27 .2 12.9 
Over 1000 4 . 7 5.4 5.5 7.9 2.7 
Average 433 424 445 463 283 
Age of 0Eerator 
Under 35 5.8 7.3 5.4 6.0 22.5 
35-44 16.3 17 .4 14.5 15.6 19.5 
45-54 26.6 23.9 25.1 26.4 22.6 
55-64 37.7 37.5 38.1 33.8 23.9 
Over 65 13.7 13.8 16.8 18.2 11. 5 
Average 54 53 54 54 48 
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Dependent Variables 
The i n itia l ana lysis of the use of ma rketing i nstruments 
and crop insurance included cross-tabulations of the use of 
each bus iness risk instr ument by several classification 
variables, including age, total acres , gross sales, 
debt - to-asset ratio, cash flow to equity ratio, management 
return, and financial stress classes. I n the development of 
the marketing and crop insurance logistic r egression models, 
simple linear regression was first used to determine the 
relevant dependent and independent variables. A system of 
hypot hes iz ed models were t hen devel oped. The remainder of this 
chapter defines the dependent and independent variables used in 
this thesis, the hypo t hesized relationships, and t he models 
tested. 
Forward pricing 
Table 3.2 contains the questions from the 1988 Iowa Farm 
Finance Survey concerning whether farmers use various forward 
pricing instruments for each of fo ur enterprise groups: grain, 
hogs, feeder cattle, and fed ca tt le. 
Forward cash contracts, price later contrac t s, and 
minimum price contracts are three types of forward contracts, 
so another variable was created and coded "l" if any one of the 
three types were used and "O" if not. Variables were also 
created to indicate use of forward contracts, futures hedges, 
and futures options for the whole farm. This variable was 
coded "l" if the instrument was used for any of the enterprise 
31 
Table 3.2. Question 15: 1988 Iowa Farm Finance Survey 
Wh ich of the following marketing tools have you used in 
pricing grain or livestock during the last two years? 
a. Cash marketing or government 
loans only .... •........... . .. 
b. Forward cash contracts .••...... 
c. Price later contracts ... ...... . 
d. Minimum price contracts ....... . 
e. Futures market for hedging ..... 
f . Agricultural commodity options. 
Feeder Fed 
Grain Hogs Cattle Cattle 
-+-~~--+-~~~--+-~~~--+-~~~-+-
-+--~~--+-~~~--+-~~~--+-~~~-+-
----~~--~~~--~~~--~~~--+-
-'-~~--'-~~~--'-~~~--'-~~~---'-
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groups and coded 11 0 11 if not. If none of the forward pricing 
instruments were used, the "cash marketing or government loans 
only" variable was coded "l" to indicate a positive response, 
otherwise "O". 
The marketing tool variables that were used as dependent 
variables in the logistic regression models are summarized 
below. The use of marketing tools to sell feeder cattle was 
not included in the regression analysis because of the small 
number of respondents that sold feeder cattle. 
1. FWDPRICE = 1 if the farm used either forward 
contracts, futures hedges, or futures 
options in marketing produce in the last 
two years. 
= 0 otherwise. 
2. FWDCONTR = 1 if the farm used forward contracts in 
marketing produce in the last two years. 
= O otherwise. 
3. FUTBEDGE = 1 if the farm used futures markets for 
hedging in marketing produce in the last 
two years. 
= 0 otherwise. 
4. FTOPTION = 1 if the farm used futures options in 
marketing produce in the last two years. 
= O otherwise. 
5. FWDPRICG = 1 if the farm used forward contracts, 
futures hedges, or futures options to 
market grain in the last two years. 
6. FWDCTG 
= 0 otherwise. 
= 1 if the farm used forward contracts in 
marketing grain in the last two years. 
= O otherwise. 
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7. FHEDGEG = 1 if the farm used futures markets for 
hedging grain in the last two years. 
= 0 otherwise. 
8. FOPTIONG = 1 if the farm used futures options for 
marketing grain in the last two years. 
= O otherwise. 
9. FWDPRICH = 1 if the farm used forward contracts, 
futures hedges, or futures options in 
marketing hogs in the last two years. 
10. FWDCTH 
= 0 otherwise . 
= 1 if the farm used forward contracts in 
marketing hogs in the last two years. 
= 0 otherwise. 
11. FHEDGEH = 1 if the farm used futures markets for 
hedging hogs in the last two years. 
= 0 otherwise. 
12. FOPTIONH = 1 if the farm used futures options for 
marketing hogs in the last two years. 
= O otherwise. 
13. FWDPRICC = 1 if the farm used forward contracts, 
futures hedges, or futures options in 
marketing fed cattle in the last two 
years. 
14. FWDCTC 
= O otherwise . 
= 1 if the farm used forward contracts in 
marketing fed cattle in the last two 
years. 
= 0 otherwise. 
15. FHEDGEC = 1 if the farm used futures markets for 
hedging fed cattle in the last two years. 
= O otherwise. 
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16. FOPTIONC = 1 if the farm used futures options for 
marketing fed cattle in the last two 
years. 
= O otherwise. 
Crop insurance 
Table 3.3 contains the questions from the survey 
pertaining to the use of private hail / fire and federal 
multi-peril crop insurance. Each insurance variable was coded 
"l" if it was used and "O" if it was not used. 
A variable to indicate all possible combinations of use 
of the two types of crop insurance was also created. Values 
for this variable are summarized below. 
INSCLASS = 3 if the farm purchased both hail / fire and 
multi-peril crop insurance in the last two 
years. 
= 2 if the farm purchased only multi-peril 
crop insurance in the last two years. 
= 1 if the farm purchased only hail / fire 
crop insurance in the last two years. 
= 0 if the farm did not purchase either 
multi-peril or hail/ fire crop insurance 
in the last two years. 
An additional regression model was constructed for forward 
contracting crop insurance. Question 18 on the survey is shown 
in Table 3.3. This variable was coded "O" to indicate a "no" 
or "does not apply" response and coded "l" to indicate a "yes" 
response. The regression was run to test who might be 
interested in purchasing such insurance . The forward 
contracting crop insurance variable is summarized below. 
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Table 3.3. Question 20: 1988 Iowa Farm Finance Survey 
During the past two years, have you purchased the following? 
Yes No 
a. Private hail(fire.crop in~urance ...•...........• I 
b. Federal mult1-per1l crop insurance •• • ••••....... ~-~~-L-~~...._ 
Question 18: 1988 Iowa Farm Finance Survey 
If crops were forward contracted during the last two years: 
c. Would you consider forward contracting 
a larger portion of your marketing if Does Not 
insurance were available to limit Yes No Apply 
losses during a short crop?" •••••...... -1~~~--~~----~--~.._, 
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FCINSUR = 1 if the farm operator indicated that he 
would consider purchasing forward 
contracting crop insurance. 
= O if the farm operator indicated that he 
would not buy forward contracting crop 
insurance or the question did not apply. 
Independent Explanatory Variables 
Independent variables used in the various marketing models 
the crop insurance model, and the forward contracting insurance 
model include those listed below, which are continuous unless 
otherwise specified : 
1. AGE = age of the farm operator. 
2. GROSALES = dollar amount of gross farm sales for all 
farm produce. 
3. CROPS = percent of total gross farm sales that 
were from crop sales. 
4. PORK = percent of total gross farm sales that 
were from hog sales. 
5. BEEF = percent of total gross farm sales t hat 
were from cattle sales. 
6. PCTRENT = percent of total acres operated that were 
rented. 
7. DAR88 =debt-to-asset ratio on January 1, 1988. 
8. ROAAT =return on assets (after tax). 
9. FINSTRCL = 1 if the farm operation is classified as 
severely stressed or in a weak financial 
position according to the classification 
system used for the "1988 Iowa Farm 
Finance Survey." 
= 0 if the farm operation is classified as 
in a stable or strong financial position 
according to the classification system used 
for the "1988 Iowa Farm Finance Survey ." 
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10. OTHFWDP = 1 if other forward pricing instruments 
were used in the last two years, other 
than the particular forward pricing 
instrument being tested. 
= 0 otherwise. 
11. INSURNCE = 1 if either hail/fi re or multi-peril 
crop insurance was purchased in the 
last two years. 
= O otherwise. 
12. DECOUPLE = 1 if the survey respondent agrees 
with moving to a market oriented 
policy by decoupling and phasing 
down income supports over a period 
of years. 
= 0 if the survey respondent disagrees 
with or is not sure about moving to a 
market oriented policy by decoupling. 
13. MANDCONT = 1 if the survey respondent agrees 
with the US implementing higher price 
supports and mandatory production 
controls if approved in a farmer 
referendum. 
14. PCTFC 
= O if the survey respondent disagrees 
with or is not sure about implementing 
mandatory production controls, if 
approved in a farmer referendum. 
= percent of the crop forward contracted 
prior to harvest, for those that forward 
contracted crops during the last two 
years. 
Note that OTHFWDP will take on a different value depending on 
which forward pr icing instrument is being tested. It also only 
refers to other forward pricing instruments for the particular 
commodity be tested. 
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Hypothesized Relationships 
In accordance with the conceptual model presented in 
Chapter II, it is possible to hypothesize relationships between 
the dependent and independent variables. The following 
hypothesized relationships are used to define the empirical 
models tested. 
Farm factors 
1. Age is hypothesized to be negatively correlated with 
the use of forward pricing mechanisms and crop insurance. 
Younger farmers are likely to experience greater levels of 
financial risk, due to the use of debt financing. Therefore, 
they would be more likely to use tools to decrease business 
risk in order to decrease total risk. Also, younger farmers 
are likely to have more education relative to the use of 
forward pricing mechanisms and crop insurance. 
2. Farm size, as measured by total acres operated or 
gross farm sales, is hypothesized to be positively coyrelated 
with the use of business risk tools. This is because larger 
farmers tend to have narrower profit margins, have more income 
at stake, and are also likely to derive a higher percentage of 
their income from the farm. Smaller operations are likely to 
be more dependent on off-farm sources of income, which should 
result in a less variable income stream. In addition, l arger 
farms would spread the time and expenditure necessary to gather 
market information over more units of production, resulting in 
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lower marketing costs per unit. Finally, futures market 
participants are required to buy certain minimum amounts, 
depending on the contract size, so smaller farm operations may 
not produce enough volume to utilize such instruments. 
3. The size of enterprise relative to total farm size is 
hypothesized to be positively correlated with the use of 
forward pricing mechanisms for that particular enterprise. 
This is measured by the gross sales for the enterprise as a 
percent of total gross farm sales. 
4. Rented acres as a percent of total acres is 
hypothesized to be positively correlated with the use of crop 
business risk tools. As rented acres increase, the risk of 
inadequate income to make cash· rent payments also increases. 
Farm financial factors 
1. The debt-to-asset ratio is hypothesized to be 
positively correlated with the use of business risk tools. 
Farm operations with increasing levels of financial risk, as 
measured by the DA ratio, would likely use such business risk 
tools to reduce the total variability of income. 
2. Return on assets is hypothesized to be positively 
correlated with the use of business risk tools. Return on 
assets is a measure of the managerial ability of the farm 
operator, independent of the financing decision. 
3. Financial stress (as measured by solvency and 
liquidity) is hypothesized to be positively correlated with the 
use of business risk tools. Those under financial stress are 
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more likely to use business risk adjustment tools to stay in 
business, especially with the encouragement of their lenders. 
Use of other risk management tools 
1. The use of o ne f o rward pricing mechanism is 
hypothesized to be p ositively associated with the use of the 
other forward pricing t ools. In general, the reason for using 
the various forward pricing t ools are similar--the reducti o n of 
price variability. Therefore, the factors that induce someone 
to use a particular forward pricing t ool are also likely to 
encourage use of other forward pricing tools. 
2. The use of crop insurance is hypothesized to be 
positively correlated wi th t he use of forward pricing tools for 
those who sell grain. 
Farm policy preferences 
1. Preference for decoupling o f farm income protection 
and price support mechanisms is hypothesi z ed to be positively 
correlated with the use of forward pricing tools, for those who 
sell grain. Those that use the private risk management tools 
are more likely to benefit from more variable, marke t oriented 
prices. 
2. Preference for mandatory controls is hypothesized to 
be negatively correlated with the use of forward pricing tools, 
for those who sell grain. Those that do not use such tools are 
more likely to prefer that the government assume the 
responsibility of stabilizing prices. 
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Maximum Likelihood Logistic Regression 
Maximum likelihood logistic regression was used, rather 
than ordinary least squares, becaus e the dependent variables 
in the marketing and forward contract insurance models are 
binary (values of 0 or 1) and the dependent variable in the 
crop insurance is ordinal (values of 0, 1 , 2, or 3). Again, 
the binary marketing and forward contract insurance variables 
indicate a positive or negative response, and the ordinal crop 
insurance variable indicates all combinations of crop insurance 
usage. The logistic regression model requires fewer 
assumptions that the linear discriminate model and is the 
appropriate technique to use when the dependent variable is 
binary or ordinal (Harrell, 1986; Lines and Zulauf, 1985). 
Maximum likelihood logistic regression prediction 
equations are based on the cumulat ive logistic probability 
function (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981). The legit technique 
transforms the value of the independent variables from 
continuous variables with an unlimi ted range of possible values 
to a probability which can range from zero to one. The logit 
technique is based on logarithms, which are positive monotonic 
transformations. Therefore, the regression coefficients reveal 
some characteristics of the underlying probability of the 
dependent variable taking on a particular value, given a 
particular value of the independent variable (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1981). 
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Marketing Models Tested 
Logistic regressi o n was used to test for significant 
relationships between the use of particular marketing 
instruments and demographic, farm size, financial and business 
risk variables, as well as farm policy preferences. The models 
tested are described in this section. Many variables such as 
age, gross farm sales, and debt-to-asset ratio are in every 
model. However, some variables only enter into particular 
models, since some hypothesized relationships are only relevant 
for grain marketing and not for livestock marketing. 
All farms in the survey sample are represented in Table 
3.4, with the dependent variable as a function of the 
independent variables listed. A "+" or "-" indicates the 
hypothesized relationship as outlined in the preceding section, 
and "NA" indicates that the variable does not apply. The 
models for grain marketing are shown in Table 3.5. The models 
for hog marketing are shown in Table 3.6. The fed cattle 
marketing models are shown in Table 3.7. 
Insurance Models 
Maximum likelihood logistic regression was also the 
appropriate technique to use for the crop insurance model, 
since the dependent variable--INSCLASS--is ordinal, with the 
possible values, "O", "l", "2", and "3". The particular crop 
insurance model tested and hypothesized relationships are 
represented in Table 3.8. 
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Maximum likelihood logistic regression was used to test 
for significant characteristics of those who might be likely to 
purchase forward contracting insurance. The hypothesized 
relationships for this model are presented in Table 3.8. 
The remainder of the thesis presents the empirical 
results and the final summary and conclusions. 
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Table 3.4. Use of Marketing Tools: Models Tested for All 
Enterprises and Hypothesized Relationships 
Dependent 
Variable FWDPRICE FWDCONTR FUTHEDGE FTOPTION 
Independent 
Variables 
AGE 
GROSALES + + + + 
CROPS + + + + 
PCTRENT + + + + 
DAR88 + + + + 
ROAAT + + + + 
FINSTRCL + + + + 
OTHFWDP NA + + + 
INSURNCE + + + + 
DECOUPLE + + + + 
MANDCONT 
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Table 3.5. Use of Marketing Tools: Grain Models Tested and 
Hypothesized Relationships 
Dependent 
Variable FWD PR I CG FWDCTG FHEDGEG FOPTIONG 
Independent 
Variables 
AGE 
GROSALES + + + + 
CROPS + + + + 
PCTRENT + + + + 
DAR88 + + + + 
ROAAT + + + + 
FINSTRCL + + + + 
OTHFWDP NA + + + 
INSURNCE + + + + 
DECOUPLE + + + + 
MANDCONT 
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Table 3.6. Use of Marketing Tools: Hog Models Tested and 
Hypothesized Relationships 
Dependent 
Variable FWD PRICH FWDCTH FHEDGEH FOPTIONH 
Independent 
Variables 
AGE 
GROSALES + + + + 
PORK + + + + 
DAR BB + + + + 
ROAAT + + + + 
FINSTRCL + + + + 
OTHFWDP NA + + + 
47 
Table 3.7. Use of Market i ng Tools: Fed Cattle Models 
Tested and Hypothesized Relationships 
Dependent 
Variable FWD PR ICC FWDCTC FHEDGEC FOPTIONC 
Independent 
Variables 
AGE 
GROSALES + + + + 
BEEF + + + + 
DAR88 + + + + 
ROAAT + + + + 
FINSTRCL + + + + 
OTHFWDP NA + + + 
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Table 3.8. Crop Insurance and Forward Contract Insurance 
Models Tested and Hypothesized Relationships 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
AGE 
GROSALES 
CROPS 
PCTRENT 
DAR88 
ROAAT 
FINSTRCL 
FWDPRICE 
INSURNCE 
DECOUPLE 
MANDCONT 
PCTFC 
INSCLASS FCINSUR 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
NA + 
+ + 
+ + 
NA 
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CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter first presents frequency distributions of 
responses to survey questions on the use of forward pricing 
instruments, the use of crop insurance, and farmers' attitudes 
toward forward contracting. Second, the maximum liklihood 
logistic regression results, which test the hypotheses, are 
presented. 
Frequency Distribution Analysis 
Table 4.1 presents the survey results for the questions 
pertaining to the use of forward pricing tools. The overall 
sample size of 677 respondents indicates the number of farmers 
that completed the marketing questions. For each enterprise 
group, it is possible to estimate the percentage of the sample 
that market each commodity. Approximately 96 percent of the 
total sample marketed grain, 32 percent marketed hogs, 19 
percent marketed feeder cattle, and 25 percent marketed fed 
cattle. 
Forward pricing is more prevalent in marketing grain than 
livestock, and 58 percent of those that marketed grain used at 
least one of the three forward pricing tools: forward 
contracts, futures hedges, or options. Forward pricing was 
more prevalent . for marketing hogs than cattle, and 29 percent 
of those that marketed hogs used at least one of the forward 
pricing tools. Feeder cattle were least likely to be 
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Table 4.1. Use of Forward Pricing Instruments during the 
Last Two Years by Enterprise and for All 
Enterprises Combined (Edelman and Olsen, 1988) 
Percent that use All Grain 
Feeder Fed 
Hogs Cattle Cattle 
n (sample size) 677 650 219 129 166 
Forward Price (forward 58.2% 57.7% 28.8% 13.2% 19.9% 
contract, futures 
hedge, or options) 
Forward contracts (fwd. 52.3 52.6 13.2 3.1 4.8 
cash, price later, or 
minimum price contracts) 
Forward cash contracts 41.9 41.2 11.4 3.1 3.6 
Price later contracts 22.3 22.9 1.4 0.8 0.6 
Minimum price contracts 3~2 2.8 1.4 0.8 1.8 
Futures market hedging 15.1 11.2 17.8 7.8 15.7 
Agricultural commodity 13.1 11.5 7.8 6.2 8.4 
options 
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forward priced. Only about 13 percent of those farm operators 
who sold feeder cattle used at least one of the forward pricing 
tools. 
Use of forward contracts was more prevalent for marketing 
grain than the use of futures hedges or options. In contrast, 
livestock forward pricing was more likely to be through the use 
of futures hedges. The use of forward contracts was relatively 
greater for marketing hogs than for cattle, and only five 
percent of those that marketed fed cattle used forward 
contracts during in the last two years. 
Frequencies for the crop insurance questions are presented 
in Table 4.2. An analysis of the various combinations shows 
that 28 percent of respondents did not purchase any crop 
insurance, 32 percent purchased only private hail/fi re crop 
insurance, 11 percent purchased only federal multi-peril crop 
insurance, and 29 percent purchased both hail / fire and 
multi-peril crop insurance. Also included in Table 4.2 are the 
results to questions pertaining to the amount of grain forward 
contracted before harvest, respondent attitudes toward the risk 
of a short crop when forward contracting prior to harvest, and 
whether respondents would be interested in purchasing forward 
contract insurance for loss proctection during a short crop. 
Regression Model Results 
The specific logit regression package used for this 
analysis was LOGIST (Harrell, 1986). Chi-square values are 
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Table 4.2. Results for Crop Insurance Questions and 
Additional Forward Contracting Questions 
(Edelman and Olsen, 1988) 
Percent that purchased private hail / fire crop 
insurance in the last two years (n = 830) 
Percent that purchased federal multi-peril 
crop insurance in the last two years (n = 811) 
Percent that were encouraged by a lender 
to purchase private hail / fire crop 
insurance in the last two years (n = 815) 
Percent that were encouraged by a lender 
to purchase federal multi-peril crop 
insurance in the last two years (n = 804) 
54.1% 
35.6 
13.1 
11.9 
If crops were forward contracted during the last two years: 
What portion of the crop that was forward 
contracted prior to harvest? (n = 333) 
Does the risk of a short crop cause you to limit 
the crop forward contracted (% yes) (n = 699) 
Would you consider forward contracting a larger 
portion of crops if insurance was available to 
limit losses? (% yes) (n = 485) 
16.5% 
78 .5 
39.4 
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estimated for the regression model, the intercept terms, and 
for each independent variable. The associated level of 
significance is also printed out for each chi-square 
statistic. Finally, a model "R" value is provided which 
represents the percent of the log likelihood variation 
explained by the model. This value is analagous to the 
multiple R-squared coefficient in ordinary least squares 
analysis, and ranges from zero to one. 
The logistic regression coefficients are difficult to 
interpret but can be transformed into linear probability 
equations (Barickman, 1985). Further transformation of the 
regression coefficients might be useful for predictive 
purposes, but is not done for this analysis. Such 
transformations would provide more reliable estimates if the 
data analyzed were longitudinal. For this analysis, the beta 
coefficients are used (1) to indicate the direction of the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables, 
positive or negative, and (2) whether the relationship is 
significant. 
Overall marketing models 
The results for the overall marketing models are presented 
in Table 4.3. Sample sizes for the regression results are 
smaller than for the frequency distribution analyses, since 
inclusion in each regression model depends on having complete 
data for each of the independent variables tested. The model 
chi-square values indicate that each of these models was 
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Table 4.3. Overall Marketing Model Beta Coefficients and 
Standard Errors (n = 354) 
Independent 
Variables 
INTERCEPT 
(std. err.) 
AGE 
GROSALES 
($000) 
CROPS 
PCTRENT 
DAR88 
ROAAT 
FINSTRCL 
OTHFWDP 
INSURNCE 
DECOUPLE 
MANDCONT 
Model Chi-Sq. 
Model R 
Dependent Variable 
FWDPRICE 
-0.0107 
(0.8293) 
-0.0149 
(0.0123) 
0.00266** 
(0.00111) 
0.0134*** 
(0.0038) 
0.6091* 
(0.3586) 
0.0092* 
(0.0051) 
-0.0205** 
(0.0100) 
-0.7005* 
(0.3838) 
NA 
0.0031 
(0.2639) 
-0.2810 
(0.2520) 
-0.4978 
(0.3447) 
37.00*** 
0.203 
FWDCONTR FUTHEDGE 
-1.3646 -3.7810*** 
(0.8515) (l.2004) 
-0.0034 -0.0067 
(0.0124) (0.0171) 
0.00298*** 0.00393*** 
(0.00115) (0.00119) 
0.0197*** -0.0066 
(0.0041) (0.0054) 
0.6823* 0.8592* 
(0.3607) (0.5084) 
0.0132*** -0.0099 
(0.0051) (0.0076) 
-0.0172* -0.0071 
(0.0091) (0.0103) 
-0.8443*** 0.7278 
(0.3988) (0.5710) 
0.9488*** 1.8535*** 
(0.3090) (0.4400) 
-0.2839 0.5568 
(0.2764) (0.3945) 
-0.3586 0.6160* 
(0.2578) (0.3378) 
-0.8816** -0.9910 
(0.3553) (0.7117) 
61.88*** 54.95*** 
0.306 0.346 
*** 
** 
• 
Significant at the .01 level 
Significant at the .05 level. 
Significant at the .1 level • 
FTOPTION 
-2.8736*** 
(1.2022) 
-0.0067 
(0.0175) 
0.00304** 
(0.00121) 
-0.0115** 
(0.0058) 
-0.9013 
(0.5504) 
0.0054 
(0.0058) 
0.0139 
(0.0142) 
-0.1167 
(0.5544) 
1.2479*** 
(0.4122) 
0.6393 
(0.4326) 
0.2748 
(0.3668) 
1.0226** 
(0.4917) 
39 .89** 
0.243 
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significant at the one percent level of significance. A one 
percent level of significance means that there is a one percent 
chance that the model is shown as representing the true 
probability distribution (is significant) when it does not. 
This is commonly known as the probability of a type II error. 
Six out of ten independent variables were significant for 
the model with FWDPRICE (use of any forward pricing tool) as 
the dependent variable. These variables included GROSALES 
(dollar value of gross farm sales), CROPS (the percent of gross 
sales from crop sales), PCTRENT (the percent of land operated 
that is rented), DAR88 (debt-to-asset ratio), ROAAT (return on 
assets), and FINSTRCL (indicating financial stress). The 
hypothesized relationships held for each of these variables, 
except for ROAAT and FINSTRCL, which were negatively associated 
with the use of forward pricing tools. 
Eight out of eleven independent variables were significant 
for the model with FWDCONTR (use of forward contracts) as the 
dependent variable. These variables included GROSALES, CROPS, 
PCTRENT, DAR88, ROAAT, FINSTRCL, OTHFWDP (the use of at least 
one other forward pricing tool) and MANDCONT (preference for 
manadatory production controls). All of the hypothesized 
relationships held except for ROAAT and FINSTRCL, which were 
both negatively associated with the use of forward contracts. 
Four out of eleven independent variables were significant 
for the model with FUTHEDGE (use of futures market hedges) as 
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the dependent variable. These variables included GROSALES, 
PCTRENT, OTHFWDP, and DECOUPLE (preference for decoupling farm 
income support from price supports). The hypotheses held for 
each of these variables. 
Four out of eleven independent variables were significant 
for the model with FTOPTION (use of agriculture commodity 
options) as the dependent variable. These variables included 
GROSALES, CROPS, OTHFWDP and MANDCONT. The use of futures 
options was positively correlated with MANDCONT (preference for 
mandatory production controls) which is the opposite of the 
hypothesized sign. However, MANDCONT was negatively correlated 
with the dependent variable in each of the other models. This 
implies that some farm operators hold a different attitude 
toward use of options versus the other forward pricing tools. 
In summary, GROSALES (gross farm sales) was significant 
and positively correlated in each of the overall marketing 
models. The larger gross farm sales were, the more likely the 
farm uses at least one of the forward pricing tools. OTHFWDP 
(the use of at least one other forward pricing tool, other than 
the one being tested) was significant and positively correlated 
with the dependent variable in each model which it entered. 
This shows that farmers who use one forward pricing tool were 
likely to use at least one other of the forward pricing tools. 
Grain marketing models 
Table 4.4 shows the regression results for the grain 
marketing models. The results of the grain marketing models 
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were similar to the overall marketing model results in who each 
model chi-square was significant at the one percent level. 
Also, gross farm sales was significant and positively 
correlated in each of the four models. The use of other 
forward pricing tools was also significant and positively 
correlated with the use of grain forward pricing tools, for the 
three applicable models. 
Six out of ten independent variables were significant for 
the model with FWDPRICG (use of any one of the forward pricing 
tools to market grain) as the dependent variable. These 
variables included GROSALES, CROPS, PCTRENT, DAR88, ROAAT, and 
FINSTRCL. However, ROAAT and FINSTRCL were negatively 
correlated with the use of forward pricing tools to market 
grain. These signs are the opposite of the hypothesized 
relationships. 
Seven out of eleven independent variables were significant 
for the model with FWDCTG (use of forward contracts to market 
grain) as the dependent variable. These variables included 
GROSALES, CROPS, DAR88, ROAAT, FINSTRCL, OTHFWDP, and 
MANDCONT. These variables showed signs that were consistant 
with those hypothesized, except for ROAAT and FINSTRCL, which 
were negatively correlated with FWDCTG. 
Three out of eleven independent variables were significant 
for the model with FHEDGEG (use of futures market hedges for 
grain) as the dependent variable. These variables included 
GROSALES, CROPS and OTHFWDP. The sign for CROPS was not 
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Table 4.4. Grain Marke ting Model Beta Coefficients and 
Standard Errors (n = 341) 
Independent 
Variables 
INTERCEPT 
(std. err.) 
AGE 
GROSALES 
($000) 
CROPS 
PCTRENT 
DAR88 
ROAAT 
FINSTRCL 
OTHFWDP 
INSURNCE 
DECOUPLE 
MANDCONT 
Model Chi-sq. 
Model R 
Dependent Variable 
FWDPRICG FWDCTG 
-0.6964 -1.4137 
(0.8609) (0 .8711) 
-0.0074 -0.0015 
(0.0125) (0.0125) 
0.00298*** 0.00329*** 
(0.00115) (0.00118) 
0.0164*** 0.0183*** 
(0.0041) (0.0042) 
0.6291* 0.5876 
(0.3650) (0. 3637) 
0.0110** 0.0132** 
(0.0054) (0.0054) 
-0.0191* -0.0174* 
(0.0102) (0.0091) 
-0.7640* -0.7879* 
(0.3965) (0.4022) 
NA 0.6789** 
(0.3439) 
-0.1464 - 0.2456 
(0.2728) (0.2765) 
-0.1860 - 0.2092 
(0.2570) (0 .2592) 
-0.4857 -0.7976** 
(0.3521) (0.3565) 
38.14*** 49.43*** 
0.215 0.264 
*** Significant at the .01 level. 
** Significant at the .05 level. 
* Significant at the .1 level. 
FHEDGEG 
-5.8424*** 
(1.4727) 
0.0047 
0.0196 
0.00435*** 
(0.00113) 
-0.0122* 
(0.0069) 
0.9426 
(0.5889) 
-0.0030 
(0.0086) 
-0.0070 
(0.0116) 
0.0163 
(0.6987) 
1.2128** 
(0.4882) 
0.6703 
(0.4875) 
0.5667 
(0.3902) 
-0 .5841 
(0.7173) 
39.44*** 
0.261 
FOPTIONG 
-4.3699*** 
(1.3551) 
0.0032 
(0.0190) 
0.0033*** 
(0.00127) 
-0 . 0058 
(0.0066) 
-0.53 07 
(0.5788) 
0 .0036 
(0.0060) 
0.0076 
(0.0140) 
0.2805 
(0.5827) 
0.0256** 
(0.4463) 
0.9163* 
(0.5195) 
0.5855 
(0.4089) 
1.0900** 
(0.5294) 
33.98*** 
0.189 
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consistant with the hypothesis. This means that those that 
used futures markets to hedge grain were likely to derive more 
of their income from livestock sales, relative to the rest of 
the sample. 
Four out of eleven independent variables were significant 
for the model with FOPTIONG (use of futures options for 
marketing grain) as the dependent variable. These variables 
included GROSALES, INSURNCE, OTHFWDP, and MANDCONT. MANDCONT 
was positively correlated with FTOPTONG, which is the opposite 
of the hypothesized relationship. 
In sununary, for the grain marketing models, as with the 
overall marketing models, GROSALES and OTHFWDP were significant 
and positively correlated at the five percent level for each of 
the models in which they entered. MANDCONT had a significant 
negative correlation with the use of forward contracts (as 
hypothesized) and a significant positive correlation with the 
use of agricultural commodity options (the opposite of what was 
hypothesized). This is consistant with the overall marketing 
models. Finally, CROPS was negatively correlated with the use 
of futures hedges to market grain, so the percentage of gross 
sales from livestock was positively correlated with the use of 
grain futures hedges. 
Hog marketing models 
Table 4.5 shows the regression results for the hog 
marketing models. The hog marketing models did not have as 
high of R values, or predictive abilitiy, as the marketing 
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models for all farm observations and grain marketing models. A 
major difference is that gross farm sales was significant in 
only two of four hog marketing models. The model chi-square 
with FWDPRICH (the use of one or more of the forward pricing 
tools to market hogs) as the dependent variable was significant 
at the ten percent level. The model chi-square with FWDCTH 
(the use of forward contracts to market hogs) as the dependent 
variable was not significant. However, the model with FHEDGEH 
(the use of futures hedges to market hogs) and the model with 
FOPTION (the use of commodity options to market hogs) as 
dependent variables were each significant at the one percent 
level. 
Two out of seven independent variables were significant 
for the model with FWDPRICH as the dependent variable. 
However, the model chi-square was not significant. The 
significant variables included AGE (farm operator age) and 
GROSALES. This is the first model discussed for which AGE has 
been significant, and younger operators were more likely to use 
forward pricing tools to market hogs, as expected. 
There were no significant variables for the model with 
FWDCTB as the dependent variable. The model chi-square was not 
significant as well. 
Four out of seven independent variables were significant 
for the model with FHEDGEH as the dependent variable . These 
variables included GROSALES, OTHFWDP, AGE and PORK (the percent 
of gross sales from pork). All of these relationships were as 
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Table 4.5. Hog Marketing Model Beta Coefficients and 
Standard Errors (n = 135) 
Independent 
Variables 
INTERCEPT 
(std. err.) 
AGE 
GROSALES 
($000) 
PORK 
DAR88 
ROAAT 
FINSTRCL 
OTHFWDP 
Model Chi-
Square 
Model R 
Dependent Variable 
FWDPRICH 
0.8240 
(1.1941) 
-0.0462** 
(0.0204) 
0.00260* 
(0.00133) 
0.0066 
(0.0081) 
-0 .00 30 
(0.0091) 
-0.0242 
(0 .0160) 
0.5955 
(0.7188) 
NA 
12.43 
0.082 
FWDCTH 
-0.5972 
(1.6622) 
-0.0418 
(0.0281) 
0.00120 
(0.00187) 
0.0117 
(0.0117) 
-0.0130 
(0.0126) 
-0 .0122 
(0.0126) 
-0.9708 
(0.9799) 
0.2486 
(0.6214) 
5.94 
0.0 
*** 
** 
* 
Significant at the .01 level. 
Significant at the .05 level. 
Significant at the . 1 level. 
FHEDGEH FOPTIONH 
-0.2962 -6.6671*** 
(1.3574) (2.4006) 
-0 .0408* 0.0023 
(0.0241) (0.0371) 
0.00315** 0.00332 
(0.00150) (0.00233) 
-0.0014 0.0202 
(0.0094) (0.0164) 
-0.0046 0.0306* 
(0.0103) (0.0177) 
-0.0213 0.0071 
(0 .0172 ) (0.0327) 
0.1456 -2 .4201* 
(0.8335) (1.4570) 
1.2548** 2.9669*** 
(0.5061) (0.9133) 
20.03*** 28.07*** 
0.202 0.403 
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hypothesized, except for PORK, which indicates that farms that 
derive greater percentages of their gross income from hog 
marketings are less likely to use futures hedges in marketing 
hogs. Conventional wisdom and the model results suggest that 
continuous hog marketings reduces marketing risks and use of 
hedging in hog contracts. 
Three out of seven independent variables were significant 
for the model with FOPTIONH as the dependent variable. These 
variables included OTHFWDP, DAR88 and FINSTRCL. The 
hypothesized signs held, except for FINSTRCL, which was 
negatively correlated with the use of futures options to market 
hogs. 
In summary, the models show that farm size, as measured by 
gross sales, was not as strongly associated strongly with 
forward pricing of hogs as it is for forward pricing grain. 
However, age showed a significant negative relationship with 
the use of forward pricing tools for hogs, while no significant 
relationships were found between age and the use of marketing 
risk adjustment tools for any of the other enterprises. Also, 
OTHFWDP was not significant in the hog forward contracting 
model (FWDCTH as the dependent variable). Therefore, farmers 
that used forward contracting to market hogs were not as likely 
to use either futures hedges or commodity options. However, 
the use of futures hedges and commodity options were 
significant and positively correlated with each other. 
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Fed cattle marketing models 
Table 4.6 shows the regression results for the fed cattle 
marketing models. The R values were higher for the fed cattle 
marketing models than for the hog models. Each of the fed 
cattle model chi-squares were s i gnificant at the one percent 
level of significance. However, the fed cattle forward 
contracting model had no significant variables and had a lower 
R value than the other fed cattle marketing models. 
Two out of seven independent variables were significant 
for the model with FWDPRICC (the use of any one of the three 
forward pricing tools to market fed cattle) as the dependent 
variable. GROSALES and BEEF (the percent of gross sales from 
the sale of cattle) were each significant and positively 
correlated with FWDPRICC, as hypothesized. 
As already mentioned, there are no significant variables 
in the model with FWDCTC (use of forward contracts in marketing 
fed cattle) as the dependent variable. Also, as shown earlier 
in Table 4.1, the use of forward contracts is not very 
prevalent for marketing cattle. 
Three out of seven independent variables were significant 
for the model with FHEDGEC (the use of futures hedges to 
market fed cattle) as the dependent variable. GROSALES and 
OTHFWDP and BEEF were significant and positively correlated. 
These relationships were all as hypothesized. This model had a 
higher R value (43%) than all of the other models tested in 
this thesis. 
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Table 4.6. Fed Cattle Marketing Model Beta Coefficients and 
Standard Errors (n = 98) 
Independent 
Variables 
INTERCEPT 
(std. err.) 
AGE 
GROSALES 
($000) 
BEEF 
DAR88 
ROAAT 
FINSTRCL 
OTHFWDP 
Model Chi-
Square 
Model R 
Dependent Variable 
FWDPRICC FWDCTC 
-2.1813 -4.7926 
(l.5021) (4.2430) 
-0.0462 -0.0284 
(0.0131) (0.0710) 
0.00435** 0.00264 
(0.00184) (0.00272) 
0.0225** 0.0340 
(0.0105) (0.0265) 
0.0066 0.0094 
(0.0144) (0.0377) 
0.0040 0.0161 
(0.0211) (0.0548) 
-1.1588 -6.1829 
(l.3329) 
NA 0.9251 
(1.5466) 
18.02*** 27.61*** 
0.246 0.086 
*** 
** 
* 
Significant at the .01 level. 
Significant at the .05 level. 
Significant at the .1 level. 
FHEDGEC 
-2.3535 
(2.2491) 
-0.0241 
(0.0359) 
0.00639** 
(0.00251) 
0.0235* 
(0.0140) 
-0.0343 
(0.0230) 
-0.0276 
(0.0364) 
0.1456 
(0.8335) 
2.5498*** 
(0.9405) 
33.30*** 
0.437 
FOPTIONC 
-2.0533 
(1.9277) 
-0.0437 
(0.0350) 
0.00080 
(0.00171) 
0.0251* 
(0.0146) 
0.0127 
(0.0196) 
0.0135 
(0.0268) 
-1.0169 
(l.6693) 
2.0066** 
(0.8976) 
28.84*** 
0.348 
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Two out of seven independent variables were significant 
for the model with FOPTIONC (the use of agricultural commodity 
options to market fed cattle) as the dependent variable. 
OTHFWDP and BEEF were significant and positively correlated, as 
hypothesized. 
In summary, hedging and options are the preferred forward 
pricing tools used by fed cattle producers. The explanatory 
power of the results of these two models are consistant with 
this conclusion. Gross farm sales and other forward pricing 
variables were the most relevant variables to predict the use 
of forward pricing mechanisms in marketing fed cattle. Both of 
these variables were positively corre l ated with the use of 
forward pricing. Also, the percentage of gross farm sales from 
beef was significant in explaining the use of forward pricing 
tools for marketing fed cattle and was also positively 
correlated. 
Feeder cattle models 
After an initial run of feeder cattle marketing models, it 
was determined that there was not a sufficient sub-sample of 
feeder cattle producers or use of feeder cattle contracts to 
merit analysis of the results. 
Crop insurance models 
Two crop insurance regression models were used to test for 
significant relationships between the use of varying levels of 
crop insurance coverage and farm operator characteristics. 
INSCLASS was the dependent variable, with values ranging from 
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zero to three. When the dependent variable is multichotomous 
(as i n the crop insurance model) the regression coefficient 
represents the probability of an observation falling into one 
class relative to the probability of f alling into a base 
reference class. The base class for the crop insurance model 
is 11 0", which represents no crop insurance coverage. The first 
model is an unrestricted model which included all independent 
variables that were used for the marketing models. The second 
model is a restricted model which excluded the variables from 
the first model that were not signif i cant or nearly 
significant. More observations were available in the 
restricted model since fewer variables were tested. The 
results of the two models are shown in Table 4.7. 
In the first model, CROPS and DAR88 were significant and 
positively correlated with the use of increasing levels of crop 
insurance. In addition, DECOUPLE was significant and 
negatively correlated with increasing levels of crop 
insurance. 
In the second model, all independent variables were 
significant. PCTRENT, CROPS, and DAR88 were all positively 
correlated with the use of increasing levels of crop 
insurance. DECOUPLE was negatively correlated with increasing 
levels of crop insurance coverage. 
The results indicate that crop farmers are more likely to 
purchase crop insurance, as expected. Also, farmers that rent 
a greater proportion of operated land were more likely to 
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Table 4.7. Crop and Forward Contract Insurance Model Beta 
Coefficients and Standard Errors 
Independent 
Variables 
ALPHAl 
(std. err.) 
ALPHA2 
ALPHA3 
INTERCEPT 
AGE 
GROSALES 
($000) 
CROPS 
PCTRENT 
DAR88 
ROAAT 
FINSTRCL 
Dependent Variable 
INSCLASS 
(n = 354) 
0.7258 
(0.6711) 
-0.6867 
(0.6711) 
1.2239* 
(0.6730) 
NA 
-0.0054 
(0.0099) 
0.00007 
(0.00072) 
0.0073** 
(0.0032) 
0.4195 
(0.2935) 
0.0080** 
(0.0036) 
-0.00077 
(0.00637) 
-0.2439 
(0.3101) 
INSCLASS 
(n = 504) 
-0.1899 
(0.2103) 
-1.5265* 
(0.2207) 
-2.0749* 
(0.2292) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
0.0085* 
(0.0024) 
0.8372* 
(0.2166) 
0.0096* 
(0.0026) 
NA 
NA 
** Significant at the .05 level. 
* Significant at the .1 level. 
FCINSUR 
(n = 171) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
-0.5585 
(1.3051) 
-0.0222 
(0.0188) 
0.00154 
(0.00102) 
-0.0021 
(0.0062) 
-0.2611 
(0.5403) 
0.0005 
(0.0066) 
0.0069 
(0.0112) 
0.4773 
(0.5895) 
FCINSUR 
(n = 300) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
-0.50 59 
(0.6780) 
-0.0195* 
(0.0110) 
0.00181** 
(0.00083) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
0.1633 
(0.2897) 
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Table 4.7. (continued) 
Dependent Variable 
Independent INSCLASS INSCLASS FCINSUR FCINSUR 
Variables (n = 354) (n = 504) (n = 171) (n = 300) 
INS URN CE NA NA 1.6880*** 1.0566*** 
(0.4430) (0.2993) 
FWDPRICE -0.0328 NA -0.1998 NA 
(0.2089) (0.4946) 
DECOUPLE -0.5162** -0.3682* 0.1554 NA 
(0.2104) (0.1672 (0.3730) 
MANDCONT -0.2758 NA 0.7028 0.6299* 
(0.2940) (0.5419) (0.3331) 
PCTFC NA NA 0.0069 NA 
(0.0104) 
Model Chi- 23.71* 57.27* 25.25** 26.58*** 
Square 
Model R 0.062 0.190 0.072 0.211 
*** Significant at the .01 level. 
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purchase greater amounts of crop insurance coverage. 
The debt-to-asset ratio was also positively correlated with 
increased use of crop insurance, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis. 
Forward contract insurance models 
Two models were used to test for significant relationships 
between a willingness to purchase insurance to protect against 
a short crop when forward contracting (FCINSUR) and the 
independent variables. Similar to the crop insurance model, 
the first model was unrestricted and included all variables 
that were used t o test the use of marketing tools. The second 
model was restricted and tested only those independent 
variables that were found to significant or nearly 
significant. Also included in the first model was PCTFC, which 
indicates the percen t of the crop that is forward contracted 
prior to harvest, if forward contracts are used. The model 
results are shown in Table 4.6. 
In the first model, only INSURNCE (the use of either 
hail/fire or multi-peril insurance in the last two years) was 
found to be significant. Those that purchase crop insurance 
were more likely to be willing to purchase insurance to protect 
against a short crop when forward contracting. The model 
chi-square was significant. 
In the second model, AGE, GROSALES, INSURNCE, and MANDCONT 
were significantly correlated with FCINSUR. AGE was negatively 
correlated, while the other variables were positively 
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correlated with FCINSUR. 
The results show that those that purchase crop insurance, 
younger farm operators, larger farm operations, and those that 
favor mandatory production controls are more likely to be 
interested in purchasing insurance to protect against a short 
crop when forward contracting, if such a product were offered. 
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CHAPTER V. SUM.MARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis analyzes the relationships among the use of 
forward pricing tools and crop insurance, and farm 
characteristics, financial position, and policy preferences. 
A goal of current farm programs is to become more 
market-oriented. Some have suggested that federal crop 
insurance and private marketing tools are expected to replace 
federal assistance. The use of forward pricing tools and crop 
insurance might ease this transition to more variable prices 
and incomes. This study focuses on analyzing who is using such 
tools. 
The results may also be of interest to agribusinesses that 
wish to better understand what products are desired by various 
segments of the farmer demand. Finally, the results may be of 
interest to farmers and educators. 
The methods used to determine factors significantly 
related with the various risk transfer tools include frequency 
distribution analysis and maximum likelihood logistic 
regression analysis. The regression models tested for 
significant l~near relationships between the use of each 
marketing tool or level of crop insurance coverage and various 
farm characteristics. 
Marketing Model Results 
Chi-square values were used to test for significance of 
each model. These values show that all models were significant 
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at the five percent level, except for the hog and fed cattle 
forward pricing and forward contracting models, which were not 
significant. 
The model R values (which indicate the percent variation 
explained by the model) ranged from zero for the hog forward 
contracting model to 44 percent for the fed cattle futures 
hedge model. For the model with forward pricing as the 
dependent variable, the R value was 20 percent. A longitudinal 
data might provide higher R values and greater predictive 
ability. 
Each independent variable was significant in at least one 
of the marketing models. The results suggest that farm size, 
as measured by gross farm sales, is the most significant 
variable associated with the use of forward pricing tools. The 
use of forward pricing tools is highly correlated with larger 
farm operations. However, this relationship was not as 
significant in the case of hog forward pricing tools, where age 
was more significant. 
The use of forward pricing tools was hypothesized to be 
negatively correlated farm operator age. This held true with 
every marketing tool, however, age was only significant in the 
case of hog forward pricing. 
The percentage of gross farm sales from crops was 
significant and negatively correlated with the use of futures 
hedges to market grain. This indicates that those that market 
relatively more livestock are more likely to use futures 
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hedges to forward price their grain. This may be because of 
the increased familiarity and use of futures markets. 
The debt-to-asset ratio was significant and positively 
correlated with the use of forward pricing tools in many of the 
models. Return on assets was significant and negatively 
correlated with the use of many of the forward pricing tools. 
This is contrary to the hypothesis, and suggests that more 
profitable farms may be less compelled to use risk transfer 
tools. However, the data analyzed is cross-sectional, and 1987 
was a relatively good year for Iowa farm product prices and 
incomes. This relationship may or may not hold over time and 
could only be tested using a longitudinal data series. 
Financially stressed operations (as measured by solvency 
and liquidity classification) were also less likely to use many 
of the forward pricing instruments. This is the opposite of 
what was hypothesized and may be due to several factors. The 
classification system defines many of the highly liquid and 
high debt operations--that may likely be able to meet current 
loan obligations--to be financially stressed. Second, some 
farm operations with relatively low debt-to-asset ratios and 
low cash flow (and not subject to immediate solvency risk) are 
classified as financially stressed. Third, off-farm income is 
included in the liquidity ratio. Farms with off-farm income 
are likely have a less variable income stream, so there would 
be less incentive to minimize income variability. Finally, it 
is possible that farmers who use forward pricing tools may have 
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avoided becoming financially stressed during the extraordinary 
financial adjustments experienced in the early to mid-1980's, 
although this is impossible to test with the data available. 
The use of other forward pricing tools was significant and 
positively correlated in most models. However, for the model 
with hog forward contracts as the dependent variable, the use 
of other forward pricing tools was not significant. 
This is also the case with fed cattle forward contracts. 
That is, for the model with fed cattle forward contracts as the 
dependent variable, the use of other forward pricing tools was 
not significant. These results suggest that those who use 
forward contracts to market livestock are not as likely to use 
futures hedges or options. 
It was hypothesized that those who favored mandatory 
controls prefer that the government minimize farm business 
risk, and should be less likely to use the private risk 
transfer tools. Those who favored mandatory controls, however, 
were more likely to use futures options but were less likely to 
use forward contracts. This suggests that farmers may view 
forward contracting, futures markets, and futures options 
markets differently. This has possible implications for 
suggesting that agribusinesses might target risk management 
products and services to specific market segments. 
It was also hypothesized that those that favor decoupling 
farm income protection from price supports would be more likely 
to favor the use of private risk adjustment tools. This 
75 
relationship held and was significant for the overall marketing 
model and in the case of futures market hedges. 
Insurance Model Results 
The crop insurance model results indicate that farmers who 
derive a greater percentage of their income from crops, those 
who rent a greater proportion of total acres operated, and 
those with higher debt-to-asset ratios are more likely to 
purchase crop insurance. All of these relationships were as 
hypothesized. 
Those who purchase crop insurance were also likely to be 
interested in purchasing insurance to protect against a short 
crop when using forward contracts, if such a product were 
offered by elevators or insurance companies. This concept 
would allow farmers to indirectly participate in the options 
market through a market agency rather that directly 
participating in the options market. In addition, younger 
operators, larger farm operations, and farmers who favor 
mandatory controls were more likely to be interested in 
purchasing such insurance. 
Conclusions and Implications 
The results show that there are significant relationships 
between the use of marketing risk adjustment tools and farm 
characteristics. In particular, larger farm operations are 
more likely to be currently using such instruments. This 
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possibly has important farm policy implications since farm 
program benefits are usually justified to protect small "family 
farm" operations. As government farm pol i cy becomes more 
market-oriented, larger farms may be better prepared to 
minimize their income variability . Increased educational 
efforts may needed to help prepare farmers for the trans i tion 
to more market determined, variable farm prices. An important 
issue raised for educators who teach marketing seminars is: 
"Do you focus on smaller, older farmers or on younger, larger 
farmers?" 
Also, there are differences between the use of forward 
contracting, futures hedges, and commodity options between 
enterprises. Forward contracting is not very prevalent for 
marketing livestock but is the most prevalent forward pricing 
tool in marketing grain. 
The use of crop insurance was not significantly associated 
with farm size. This suggests that smaller operations are less 
concerned with marketing or price risk and more concerned with 
production risk. Although federal multi-peril crop insurance 
is designed to reduce the role of government in providing 
massive disaster relief to farmers, the widespread drought 
experienced in 1988 and forthcoming federal assistance indicate 
that this goal is not completely being met at this time. It 
also raises questions about the incentives for purchasing crop 
insurance in the future. 
The results also show that farmers who might be interested 
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in purchasing insurance to protect against a short crop when 
using forward contracts (if such a product were available) are 
likely to be those that currently purchase crop insurance. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Additional research may be useful in determining why 
smaller operations do not use business risk adjustment tools as 
much as larger operations, and whether this is due to scale 
economies, a lack of interest, age, or education concerning 
business risk adjustment costs or benefits. 
A longitudinal data series could determine whether the 
relationships presented in this analysis hold over time. Of 
particular interest, is whether return on assets is negatively 
correlated with the use of marketing instruments (as it is in 
this analysis) and, if so, why. Further research might also 
consider testing the relationships between participation in 
government farm programs, other behavioral patterns, and the 
use of risk transfer tools tested herein. 
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1988 FARM FINANCE SURVEY 
1. In what county la most of your tanning operation loeated? ......................................................... 10011 l====~ 
2. What is your age? ............................................................................... .................... .. ............. (002) ======: 
3. How many dependents are you supporting (Including yourself)? ............................................. (003) ::=====~ 
4 . How many of these dependents are under 18 years? ........... ............ ...................................... (004) .__ ___ __, 
5. What is the highest level ot schooling that you have attended (cheek one)? 
Wlfe ............. (005) 0 Grade School 0 Hlgt" School 0 College or Vocational 
Husband ..... . (008) 0 Grade School 0 High School 0 College or Vocatlon;;'-al ___ __, 
6. How many years have you been faming? ................................................................................ (007) ===== 
7. How many Kr'H do you : A. Own ....................................................... ...................... ...... (008) ::=====~ 
B. Rent from others ................................................................ (009) l====~ 
C. Rent to others .............................................................. ...... 10101 l====~ 
Total L.an<S You Operate (Item A + B • C) ...................................................... 10111 .__ ___ __, 
I. From your 1987 tax records (1040, 1040F and Form 4797) or farm accounts, please supply the tollowlng ln1ormation 
on your farm Income and expenses: 
ITEM 1987 I VALUE 
u~ 
Gross Income (Form 1040F, llne 12) ...................................... 1---------~ 
021 
Sale of breeding stodl (Form 4797, line 18) ............... ............ 1-----------1 
022 
Interest (Form 1040F, add lines 23a plus 23b) ........................ 1-----------1 
023 
Depreciation (Form 1040F, llne 16) ........... ............................. 1-----------1 
024 
Total deductions (Form 10.WF, llne 36) ................................. 1---------~ 
025 
Off-fann wages (F,orm 10.W, line 7) ................. ...... .. ............... 1----------• 
02e 
Off-farm Interest (Form 1040, add lines 8 plus 9) ........ ............. 1---------~ 
027 
Total Income Form 1040 line 22 .. ...... ....................... ;.;.··-... ~ .. -···~· ....._ ______ __, 
9. Approxlmatety what perc.nt of your 1987 gross farm sales came from each of these sources? 
Crops ............... ....... .. ....... ... ...... ................. ...................... ... ......... ..... .. .... .. ......... .. (())()) :===="~I 
Beel ................................................................................. ............ ........................ (OSI) l====="~I 
Pork ..................................................................................................................... (032) ======"=:I 
Dairy ....... .............................................................................................................. (033) ~==="=:I 
Other-------------- (please specify) .................... (034) .__ ___ ..;:"::.i' 
Total .............................. .... .... . . ............. ..................................... . 100 % 
Appendix. 1988 Iowa Farm Finance Survey (page l) 
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1 o. From your financial statements for the last tv.io years , what was the mari<et value of the lann assets that you own? 
Jan. 1987 Jan. 1988 
0<10 041 
Crops and livestock for sale (Include CCC crops under loan) ................. ~-=-------+-:-:-:------i 
0'2 043 
Machinery, equipment, breeding stock ............................................... ~,..,...--------+-:-~-----o'" 04~ 
Land and Buildlngs .... ........ .................. .............................................. 1--.,..------+-:-=------1 
046 047 
Tc rel Aaaeta ......... ........................................................................ .. ---
1 1. Please give your oU1standing loan balances tor real estate and non-real estate debt by type of lender on January 1, 
1987 and 1988: 
- REAL ESTATE DEBT NON· REAL ESTATE DEBT 
Tvoe ol Lender Jan. 1987 Jan. 1988 Jan. 1987 Jan . 1988 
Bank .................. ................ U:>U s 051 s 070 s 071 s 
052 053 on 
5 
073 
Farm Credtt System ............ s s - s 
lr.>4 s 05~ 074 075 Farmers Home Admin ......... s s s 
056 057 076 on 
Insurance Colll>any ..... ....... s s s s 
066 059 078 079 
Individual. ........................... s s s s 
060 s 061 080 081 CCC and other loans ........... s s s 
062 s 063 082 083 Total Debt . ................ s $ $ 
YES NO 
12. a. Will you seek operating credit during 19887 ................................................................... ....... (090) D D 
b . Do you expect difficulty In acquiring operating credit in 19887 .............................. .................. (~ 11 D D 
c. ti you have not declared bankruptcy, are you comtelll>iating 
bankruptcy in the future? ................................ ..... ......... ....................................................... (092) D 0 
13. During the last three years: YES NO 
a. Have you told land? ................................................................... .......................... .. ............. (1001 0 0 
ti yn, was this sale ciJe to Onanclal stress? ...................................... .... ........................ .. .. 11011 D 0 
b. Have you sold equipment or breeding livestock? ............... .......................... ......................... (1021 0 0 
ti yes, was this sale we to financial stress? ...................................................................... (103) 0 0 
c . Have you given back land purchased on contract? ........................................... ..................... (104) 0 0 
d . Have you renegotiated a land contract? .... ............................................................................ pos: 0 0 
e. Have you vokmtartly turned assets back to a lender? ...... . ...................... ............................... (1061 D 0 
I. Have you received a write-down in principal owed? .............................................................. ( 107) 0 0 
g. Have you received a write-down in interest owed? ........................................................... ... ... (108) 0 0 
h. Have you receiv~ a FmHA loan guarantee? ...................................................................... ... (I OQ) 0 0 
I. Have you been foreclosed upon? ....................... ..................................................... ............ (1 101 0 0 
J. Have you declared bankruptcy? ..... .. .. .......... ......................................... ............. .................. 11 111 D 0 
ti Y•. please circle: Chapter 7 11 12 13 
(112) 
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14. When marketing your commodities, does someone In your farm unit regularly do the following? (Please check) 
Often 
UHd 
a. Utilize charts of cash price trends .... .......... .............................................. < 120> 0 
b. Utilize charts of Mures market trencts ........ ........................ ...................... 11 21 > D 
c. Use local basi& charts ............................................................................. 11 22) 0 
d. Calculate cost of ~ion ................................................................... (123) D 
e . Develop a written marketing ptan ............................................................. 112•1 0 
SometlmH 
UHd 
0 
CJ 
0 
0 
0 
Not 
UHd 
D 
CJ 
CJ 
CJ 
CJ 
15. Which of the following marketing tools have you used In pricing grain or livestock during the last two years? 
Grain 
a. cash marketing or government loans only .................... (130) c::J 
b. Forward cash contracts ................................................ (131) D 
c. Price later contracts ..................................................... 11:.21 CJ 
d. Minlrrum price contracts ............................. ................. (133) CJ 
e. Futures market for hedging ......................................... (13') CJ 
I. ,A,grlcultural commodity oplions .................................... (135) CJ 
rog•, 
(230) 
(231 ) 0 
(232) 0 
(233)0 
(234) 0 
(235) 0 
Feeder 
Cattle 
{$Kl) D 
(331) 0 
(332)CJ 
(3.33)CJ 
(33')CJ 
(335) 0 
Fed 
Cattlt 
(430) 0 
(•3 1) CJ 
('32) 0 
<•33) 0 
1•3"C1 0 
(435) 0 
16. Who has '2!iIIlil.CX responsiblltty for the following? 
Hu1band 
a. Keeping the financial records up-to-<late ........................... ........................ (140) c:J 
b. Recording market Information and posltion ........................ ........................ (1 4 1) c::J 
Wife 
CJ 
D 
Othtr 
0 
0 
17. Please identify the most important faC10rs why you~ nm use forward contracting In the coming year: (Please 
check) 
Very 
•mrort't"t 
a. Marketing conditions favor other strategles ........................................ (1SOJ 
b. Fear of lad( of knowledge of how they work .................. ..................... (151) CJ 
c. Creditors have discouraged their use ................................................ (152) CJ 
d . Not enough time to do a good marketing job ................................. ..... (153) D 
e. Too much personal exposure to financial risk ............... ... .............. .... (1 5') CJ 
f, Too much speculation and market manipulation .............. ...... ............ (1 55) CJ 
g . Morally wrong to use such tools .................................................. ...... c 1561 D 
18. If crops were forward contracted during the past two years: 
Ptrcent 
a. What portion of your crop was forward contracted prior to harvest? cu10>_, __ 1 
b. Does the risk of a short crop cause you to limit the portion of crops YH 
that you forward contract? .................................................. ............................ cus21 D 
c. Would you consider forward contracting a larger portion of / 1.>ur marketings 
I Insurance were avaUable to Hmlt losses during a shol1 crop? ........................... (163) 0 
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Not A 
Factor 
CJ 
D 
D 
CJ 
CJ 
CJ 
CJ 
DOH Not 
~
(1S1 ) L___j 
DOH not o "ET 
D D 
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Have you ever used the following management tools? YH No 
a. Taken aoll testa torfertlllzer appllcatlons ................................................... ............................. (170) D D 
b . Figured manureneoume credits Into fertlllzatlon .......................................................... ........... (171 ) D D 
19. 
During the paS1 two years, have you purchased the following? YH No 
a. Private hall/fire crop Insurance ..................................................................... ........................ (180) D D 
b . Federal multl-perll crop lnsurance ........................................................................................... 11111 D D 
20. 
During the past two yea,., , did a lender encourage you to purchase crop Insurance? Yu No 
a. Privlle hall/Tire crop lnsurance ......................................................................... .. .................... (190) D D 
b. Federa; rTl.1111-peril crop lnsurance ...................................................... .... ..... ........................... ( 1111) D D 
21. 
22. What should be the future direction In farm policy? 
(Pleue check Qlll answer for each Item.) 
Not 
AgrH Sure Dlaagree 
a. Continue present voluntary programs which provide govemment price 
and Income supports In retvm for acreage reduction ............................ .. ......... .. c2001 D D D 
b. Move to market-oriented policy by decoupling and phasing down Income 
supports over a period of yeans ........................................................................ (20 11 D D D 
c. Implement higher price supports and mandatory produc1ion controls 
11 IPPl'Oved In a farmer relerel"QJm.: .. ...... ...... ........ ...... ..................... ................ (202) 0 D D 
d . Target more farm program spending toward the farmers who are llnanclaly 
11re11ed ............................................. ............................. ................... ............ (203) D D D 
Comments: 
• • THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION • • 
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